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I. Introduction
Avicenna (ibn-Sīnā) is often branded a Peripatetic,1 sometimes with the
qualification that he managed to synthesize onto an Aristotelian substrate a variety of
other traditions, ranging from the Galenic medical, to the Neoplatonic cosmological, and
the Islamic theological.2 Generally, historians who make this observation follow upon it
by praising Avicenna’s systematic synthesis as the culmination and convergence of
distinct traditions of philosophical commentary. For these historians, Avicenna was the
highest iteration—but an iteration no less—in a long chain of synthesizing
commentators.3 The chain dates back to the third century AD to the first great
commentator of Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and a little later to the founding of
Neoplatonism by Ammonius Saccas and his disciples, Plotinus and Porphyry; with these
men, we are told, arose the immediate concern of resolving first the tensions discretely
inherent to Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophies, and then those difficulties in reconciling
the one with the other. Avicenna’s place in the tradition occurs much later, only after
Themistius inherited the Neoplatonists’ synthesizing enterprise (fourth century AD); after
another Ammonius, son of Hermeias, broke from the Neoplatonists and introduced a new
hermeneutical method (sixth century AD); after the Christian Syriac translators brought
such enterprise to the Arab-speaking world (eighth-ninth centuries AD); after ʾIsḥāq ibnḤunayn and the al-Kindī circle contributed their Arabic translations (ninth century AD);

1 By many of his successors, most notably Al-Ghazālī, who criticized him for it in The Incoherence of the
Philosophers (Tahāfut al-Falāsifaʾ), as well as by modern scholars, preeminently Gutas, Avicenna and
the Aristotelian Tradition.
2 See Hall, “Interpreting Avicenna.”
3 Wisnovsky, “Avicenna and the Avicennan Tradition,” 97; Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian
Tradition, 255-261; Hall, “Intellect, soul and body in Ibn Sīnā,” 63-64.
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and after al-Fārābi and the Baġdād Peripatetics picked all these elements up and worked
them into their own syntheses (ninth-tenth centuries AD). We do not dispute that it is at
this point, and under the influence of these many traditions, that Avicenna flourished; yet
a few serious problems arise for attaining a more comprehensive understanding of
Avicenna’s philosophy when we simply categorize him as an iteration in a long chain.
For while historians seem generally united in proclaiming the height of Avicenna’s
synthesizing genius, they are also quick to cast the many and frequent strains in his
philosophy merely as necessary products of this same genius’ obstinate synthesizing. In
other words, for these historians, although Avicenna was the best synthesizer to have ever
lived, his philosophy still strains because of the inherent incompatibility of sections from
Aristotle, Plato, Galen and Islam. This last opinion is the one that we contest: while it
does much to account for some of the probable origins of the difficulties in Avicenna, it
does little to help us understand how his most original arguments hang together; rather, it
proceeds from the presupposition that they do not. If this were the case, then it would
mean that Avicenna was an excellent synthesizer—but a bad philosopher; and that, if so,
in a world today where interest in systematic philosophical syntheses has ebbed,
Avicenna’s readership would probably be, at best, intellectually negligible.
What we propose here is to find alternative explanations to the frequent strains in
Avicenna’s philosophy. We do not doubt that the bulk of the Avicennan corpus reads as if
it incorporates elements from preceding philosophical traditions into a remarkable
systematic synthesis. What we do doubt is whether its strains are a result of this
synthesis. Ultimately, our hope is that, if we were to reinterpret the causes of the corpus’
many strains, we would better understand the strains themselves. To this effect, we posit
2
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two extreme possibilities, both of which relate to Avicenna’s independence as a thinker.
The first is what most historians seem to presuppose, viz. that Avicenna’s works were
merely a rehashing of Aristotelian doctrines, incorporating tidbits from the other
traditions; and that Avicenna was only independent to the extent in which he chose to
interconnect these traditions, and in the original ways in which he attempted to resolve
their inherent contradictions. The other possible extreme is that Avicenna was a fully
independent thinker in his own right, who dressed his arguments in an Aristotelian
language and incorporated the other traditions out of convenience, for reasons external to
the philosophy (e.g. a desire to gain wider readership and acceptance, or the necessity of
securing patronage); in other words, in this possible scenario his works would only
effectively read like a synthesis, though it would only incidentally be a synthesis.
Whether one of these possibilities is true, or close to the truth, is what we will examine
below. The practical purpose these two extremes serve is to delimit the scope of our
inquiry; they frame our guiding questions: whether Avicenna worked from the
Aristotelian, Neoplatonic, Galenic and Islamic traditions to his ultimately original
philosophical arguments, or from an already unique philosophy to a seemingly
incorporative product. Crucially, these questions are not meant to set up a false dilemma:
the “or” in the preceding sentence should be read inclusively. It is quite possible—indeed,
it will be suggested—that the fact is somewhere in between the extremes.
Part of the difficulty in our investigation is the lack of work done on the
Avicennan corpus as a whole. Dimitri Gutas remarked already in 1988 that critical
editions of a good portion of the corpus are hard to come by even in Arabic, which has
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not changed much to date;4 translations into modern European languages are even
scarcer. This is to the detriment of a large contingent of interested Western intellectual
historians, who wish to study the development of Avicennism to better understand its
contributions to European thought, but who are incapacitated by the language barrier.5
Cognizant of this great impediment, Gutas published in 1988 the extremely useful
Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, in which one may find, for the first time,
translations of many sections of those works of Avicenna that have been often overlooked
by scholars, but which are still important to the intellectual historian. As can be inferred
from our notes, this paper is greatly indebted to Gutas’ translations and commentaries and
calls out for more of this kind of scholarship. Particularly troublesome to us is the fact
that there has been little work done on the authenticity of most of the Avicennan
corpus,6 which can cripple a truly genetic reading. Though in recent years some work has
begun to be done in this area,7 there is still much to be desired. Lastly, Gutas also astutely
observed that, although scholars are blessed with Avicenna’s autobiography, this fact has
made it seem as if any further biographical research were unnecessary, resulting in our
present ignorance about many details of the philosopher’s life and forcing us to take his
autobiography often at face value. 8
The present paper will attempt to make these problems more manageable by
concentrating on one aspect of Avicenna’s philosophy, namely psychology, and within it,
on a particular point of tension. If our method guides us rightly, our hope is to propose at
4 Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 1.
5 The present essay is a case-in-point; here we used whatever translations of Avicenna we could find into
European languages; the result is that, notwithstanding our use of English, French, Portuguese, and
Latin sources, we are limited in scope to less than a handful of Avicenna’s psychological works.
6 McGinnis, “Introduction,” ix.
7 See Reisman, “The Pseudo-Avicennan Corpus.”
8 Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 1.
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the end a solution to this point of tension that could be translated so as to elucidate many
of the other strains spread throughout the philosophical corpus. In other words, we are
using psychology, and a specific difficulty with Avicenna’s definition of the soul, as a sort
of laboratory for determining a viable answer to the question of his independence; this
insight, we claim, will aid in understanding how the whole of his philosophy hangs
together. The reason we use psychology as our “test case” in particular is that it plays a
very central role in providing cohesion to Avicenna’s wider philosophy; Robert Hall, in
fact, described it as the “spine of the system,” forming a central hub that connects to
cosmology, physiology, epistemology, metaphysics, thaumaturgy, theology and even
ethics and political theory.9 Gutas seconds this notion, saying that Avicenna’s theoretical
psychology “presents in nuce” his entire philosophical system. 10
Both Hall’s and Gutas’ opinions are buttressed by the fact that psychology works
itself into every one of Avicenna’s major philosophical treatises. Of these, Avicenna’s
first oeuvre, A Compendium on the Soul (Maqāla fī n-nafs), was entirely psychological,
as was his very last work, On the Rational Soul (Risāla fī n-nafs an-nātiqa). His
cosmological treatise, The Origin and the Return (Al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād), the first text
in which we find his mature metaphysical and emanationist scheme, is divided into three
parts, one of which features the soul, detailing its origination and permanence. The
encyclopedic The Cure (Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ), written at the request of his disciples, possesses
his longest psychological text. The shorter summa, The Salvation (Kitāb an-Najāt),
mirrors the content and organization of The Cure. There is even the question of his lost
work, The Easterners (Kitāb al-Mašriqīyūn), written in Isfahān later in his career (after
9 Hall, “Intellect, soul and body in Ibn Sīnā,” 63.
10 Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 72.
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1024), of which all that we possess is the prologue. This book has been the cause of much
debate, especially since Avicenna promises to disclose in it “the fundamental elements of
true philosophy”11—about which all we can do is speculate. What we do know is that
psychology is invoked already in The Easterners’ prologue: Avicenna discusses in
relative length his possessing more intuition than other philosophers, applying to himself
a principal tenet of his psychology.12 Lastly, it cannot go without mention that even in
Avicenna’s least theoretical and most practical work, the comprehensive Canon of
Medicine (al-Qānūn fī t-tibb), psychology figures in; although Avicenna warned his
physician readers that theoretical psychology “lie[s] outside the province of the physician
qua physician,” he still had to work into this treatise—and especially this one—at least
some account of the vital principle, even if in purely physical, often materialistic, and
most certainly not metaphysical nor cosmological, terms. 13
Ideally, we would look at each one of those works, map out all the areas in which
the synthesis seems to strain too hard, where contradictions arise, and where, to solve
these problems, Avicenna had to intervene with a new and original idea; and then,
analyzing the differences regarding these points among the various texts, we would study
the historical circumstances surrounding the writing of these treatises, so as to ultimately
understand the causes of Avicenna’s incorporative synthesizing, and, in so doing,
understand also the extent of Avicenna’s independence as a thinker. Such a method,
however, is impractical in the short term and, we would dare say, impossible for a single

11 The Easterners, sec. Prologue §6.
12 Intuition, for Avicenna, is the ability to arrive at the middle term of a syllogism without having to work
it out; it is the result of a connection of the human intellect to the heavenly Active Intellect, which is
higher up on the emanationst scheme, closer to God.
13 Hall, “Intellect, soul and body in Ibn Sīnā,” 72-73.

6

André Gregori

The Problem of Hylomorphism and Dualism
in Avicenna: A Guide to Resolving Other Tensions

person. It would be more realistic to replicate this method in a much narrower scale,
focusing on one or two texts from each principal period of Avicenna’s life, and picking
one representative area of tension, mapping out its changes (if any) throughout the
different texts. Such is the method we employ herein. Should such labor bear good fruits,
then perhaps this is a method we could suggest to our colleagues in the future. In the
meantime, we have picked a single area of tension that promises to be telling; it is
fundamental in the sense that it pervades the whole of Avicenna’s psychology, and it is
essential in the sense that it addresses quite explicitly the definition of the soul.

II. Fleshing out the difficulties
As the chosen area of tension is about the very essence of the soul, every reader of
Avicenna’s psychological works eventually has to come to grips with it. The problem is
rooted in a disagreement with Aristotle regarding the generic definition of the soul:
whereas Aristotle seems to define the soul in De anima II.1 as the substantial form of the
body, Avicenna argues, in more than one place, that the soul is itself a substance, and, in
the case of the rational soul, subsisting in itself separately from the body.14 What makes
the departure from Aristotle problematical is that Avicenna still incorporates, verbatim,
Aristotle’s generic definition of the soul into a variety of his treatises. In fact, Avicenna
clearly states, in his principal psychological works, not only that the soul is the primary
entelechy of the body, but particularly that it is also a form, implying that the relation
between soul and body is that of form to matter (i.e. hylomorphism). 15 How can he, then,

14 The Origin and the Return, III.10; The Cure: De anima, I.III; The Salvation, II.VI.XII-XIII; On the
Rational Soul, §5.
15 A Compendium on the Soul, 2; The Cure: De anima, I.I.
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in the same treatises in which he provides that very definition, also argue that the soul is a
substance, and in the case of the rational soul, not just a substance, but a separate and
self-subsistent one? And, more importantly: what were his motivations? This section will
deal with the first question, while the second is reserved to the next one.
The treatises we have chosen to investigate to answer these questions are: (I) from
Avicenna’s early period, the Compendium on the Soul; (II) from his middle period, The
Origin and the Return and (III) the psychological part (De anima) of The Cure; and (IV)
from his late period his very last work On the Rational Soul. In terms of format, the
contrast between these works is vast: the Compendium is a short dedicatory treatise; The
Origin and the Return is an idiosyncratic collection of three treatises, each containing
short, paragraph-long chapters; The Cure is long and encyclopedic, fleshing out in detail
even the most minor considerations; and On the Rational Soul is the shortest, reading
much like a hurried and cursory summary. Curiously, however, in terms of their
psychological content, these treatises differ only with regard to quantity, not substance;
that is, they only differ with regard to how much of Avicenna’s doctrines fit into each, not
the content of those doctrines. As we look to these samples from the Avicennan corpus to
better understand the tension between the soul’s self-subsistent substantiality and its place
in hylomorphism, one thing becomes apparent: what was an apparently “weak” tension in
the Compendium becomes almost irresolvable in the later works, starting with The Origin
and the Return. This difference is important, as it tells of the consistency of Avicenna’s
philosophy, a fundamental piece to the puzzle of his ultimate independence as a thinker.

8
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1. Compendium on the Soul

In the Compendium Chapter 2 Avicenna explicitly states that “the soul is a form,
and forms are realized perfections (entelecheia).” Compendium Chapter 9, however, is
entirely a proof of the rational soul’s immateriality and substantiality. 16 Avicenna’s proof
seems to be a conflation of Aristotle’s argument in De anima III.5, viz. that the potential
intellect does not function through a bodily organ, with the one in III.6, viz. that the
intellect can only think of indivisible things if those things are necessarily true (if they
can be false, Aristotle posits, then they are divisible). Aristotle does not draw the
conclusion in either of these passages that the soul is a substance; inferring such a
conclusion from these arguments is Avicenna’s own, original addition. Avicenna’s claim
here, however, is not entirely incompatible with Aristotle’s position; notice that in
Compendium Chapter 9 Avicenna is not arguing that the rational soul is subsistent
through itself. Furthermore, other arguments that we find in his later works—that the soul
is perpetual, for instance—which arguments would lead us to infer his belief in a selfsubsistent soul, are entirely absent from the Compendium. So long as there is room to
believe that Avicenna was speaking of the soul as a substance, but immanent to and
dependent upon a subject, the body, for its existence, then there is some room for
reconciliation with Aristotle’s position. After all, in De anima II.1 Aristotle uses the
phrase, “the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body,” which
rings of Avicenna’s earlier usage of the word “form” in Compendium Chapter 2. That
16 Van Dyck translated it “essentiality” rather than “substantiality.” Strictly speaking, essence and
substance have different meanings in the Peripatetic tradition. The original word that Van Dyck
translated as “essence” is jawhar; this term figures in various other works by Avicenna, and it is usually
translated as “substance” for nuanced philosophical reasons that do not merit discussion here. The
Arabic word usually understood as “essence” is dat. For further reference, see the very useful ArabicPortuguese glossary in Iskandar, A origem e o retorno, 265-282.
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previous phrase, however, is not to imply that Aristotle believes that the soul is a
substance per se subsistens, just as we cannot draw this inference from the Compendium.
Rather, that phrase from De anima II.1 seems to imply that the soul, insofar as it gives
being to the body, is immanently a substance, or that it is a substance when taken in
conjunction with the body. It is in this light that we interpret Aristotle’s later assertion,
still in II.1, that “we can dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the soul and the
body are one: it is as though we were to ask whether the wax and its shape are one, or
generally the matter of a thing and that of which it is the matter” (that is, the form—
emphasis added). As such, although Avicenna leaves much unsaid in Compendium, part
of the benefit of his doing so is that it gives us room to reconcile his statement that the
soul is a form with his other claim that it is a substance. However, the fact that this is
ambiguous, aside from making it a point of contention, does not resolve the tension.

2. The Origin and the Return
The tension manifests itself very differently in The Origin and the Return, where
it is arguably transformed into a contradiction. In this treatise, we find a chapter (III.10)
devoted to refuting “those who defend that the rational soul is an inseparable perfection.”
Avicenna is, in fact, responding to arguments against the soul’s separate existence and
self-subsistence, a position he espouses more overtly in Chapter III.6. The objections to
which he responds are telling in themselves: The first objection paints Avicenna’s
position with much the similar colors that Plato uses in his description of how the soul
governs the body. If the soul were a separate substance—the objection goes—then it

10
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would govern the body much like a captain governs a ship; 17 this would imply that, just as
a captain enters and exits a ship, so would the soul be capable of entering and exiting the
body. Avicenna responds by rejecting the objection as a false analogy, and, in so doing,
interestingly dissociating himself from Plato.18 Avicenna is more hesitant, however to
dissociate himself from Aristotle. This is clear from his response to the second objection.
This objection is entirely on hylomorphic, and therefore Aristotelian, grounds:
“If the soul existed separately from the body, no living thing, much less a human,
would be united with it as form does to matter.” 19
This is, in fact, a rephrasing of the tension that has, thus far, guided the entirety of
this present paper, namely, that it is impossible to hold that the soul is separate and selfsubsistent, while also holding that it is a form in the sense in which Aristotle uses the
word. However, Avicenna’s response still seems like an attempt to reconcile his position
with that of Aristotle. First, unlike the dismissal of the previous objection, Avicenna
actually credits this objection with a response. Second, the framework he uses to resolve
the objection is, at least in terminology, Aristotelian. Ultimately, Avicenna’s response
validates the objection, but at the same time it creates a new distinction, and all this
distinction does is explain the objection away. In a nutshell, Avicenna argues that, while it
may be true that the soul is not united to the body as form is to matter, it is united in the
sense that, insofar as it is a substance, it can only perfect itself (i.e. attain a certain level
of completion) when attached to a particular matter, that has the capacity to receive it.

17 Aristotle in De anima, II.1 uses precisely this same analogy, which he rules out; commentators like
Thomas Aquinas (Sententia libri De anima, lib. 2. l. 2 n. 9) have generally interpreted Aristotle to be
replying directly to Plato in this section, and rejecting his position.
18 Plato espoused a clearly dualistic psychology in the Timaeus and most notably in the Phaedo.
19 All the translations from the Portuguese are our own.
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Therefore, Avicenna attempts to detangle the difficulty by making the unity of soul to
body not simply incidental, but in fact causally rooted in the dispositions of each
substance (i.e. of the body to receive the soul and of the soul to perfect itself on that
body). This, however, does not resolve the contradiction: how can the soul be
simultaneously a self-subsistent substance and a form attached to a body?

3. De anima from The Cure
Avicenna gives the subject more of a satisfactory treatment in the De anima of
The Cure, but he is still unable to resolve the difficulty. Right in Chapter I of the first
book of De anima, Avicenna says the soul “is a form,” and, perhaps to be more
conciliatory to Aristotle, “as if a form.” Perhaps the latter is an issue of Avendauth’s Latin
translation, and it would be useful if the original Arabic were consulted. Regardless,
further down the page Avicenna gives an account of the soul that is less accommodating;
in fact, it seems to contradict his response to the objections posed in The Origin and the
Return III.10, since he says “the soul can be called ‘form’ when considered in relation to
the matter in which it exists, and an animal or vegetative substance is constituted from
both matter and form.”20 This suggests, then, that Avicenna is embracing a hylomorphic
view of the soul, painting animals and plants as composite substances, that is, composed
of both matter and form, body and soul. Here, then, Avicenna seems to be giving a
generic definition of the soul that would encompass the rational soul. A little later on,
however, in this same chapter, Avicenna adds that when he calls the soul a form, he is not
talking about the rational soul; in fact, he specifically changes terminology, switching
20 Emphasis added. Reading the antecedents of ex quibus utrisque to be forma and materia. All the
translations from the Latin are ours.
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from “form” to “perfection,” so as to be more inclusive of the rational soul:
“When we say, in teaching about the soul, that it is itself a perfection, we mean to
give to ‘perfection’ more than just the meaning of the word ‘soul,’ and, even more
than this, we mean to indicate that ‘perfection’ comprehends all the species of soul
whatsoever, which is necessary [so as to include] the soul separate from matter
[i.e. the rational soul].”
But the topic is not dropped altogether; Avicenna continues to employ the word
“form” liberally, predicating it of soul, which he also calls substance. Further down this
chapter, Avicenna, at last, addresses precisely this issue. He posits a hypothetical objector,
who says to him, “When I say, ‘the soul is a substance,’ that is, ‘the soul is a form,’ I do
not say this from a more general meaning of the word ‘form,’ but I take ‘substance’ to
have the same meaning as ‘form.’” And yet, just as Avicenna explained away the
objection in The Origin and the Return, he also shoos this one off: “There is nothing in
that.” The hypothetical objector, however, was not all in vain; in the very same
paragraph, Avicenna sees himself obliged to finally clarify what he means by “form” in
this context: “that which does not exist in a subject in any way,” which is simply a
restatement of one of Aristotle’s definitions of substance.21 In other words, it seems that
here Avicenna is using “form” strictly in this sense of “substance.” This seems to be
confirmed by Chapter III, which is devoted entirely to proving that soul falls into the
Aristotelian category of Substance. One line from this chapter summarizes Avicenna’s
position well: “Therefore, the soul is a substance, because it is a form that does not exist
in a subject.” This line would make it seem as if Avicenna were agreeing with the likes of
Thomas Aquinas in considering the soul a substantial form; but, upon closer inspection,
what Avicenna is really doing is different, since he is clearly predicating “substance” of
21 Aristotle, Metaphysics, V.8.
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“form.” In other words, it seems that here Avicenna attempted to resolve his difficulty by
employing “form” analogically, or, even, equivocally, that is, deprived of the original
Aristotelian sense of a principle immanent to matter, and concentrating solely on the
sense it shares with substance. This is the pattern visible throughout the rest of The Cure’s
De Anima. Avicenna keeping the word “form” in this context is suggestive; we will
consider his reasons for doing so in the next full section.

4. On the Rational Soul
Unlike The Cure, Avicenna’s last work, On the Rational Soul, is the least
accommodating. In §5 we see quite explicitly that “the rational soul is a substance
subsisting in itself, and is imprinted neither in a human body nor in any other corporeal
entity.” What is more telling is that Avicenna adds, in the same section, that the soul “has
a certain association with the human body as long as the person is alive, but this
association is not like the relation of a thing to its receptacle; it is, rather, like the relation
of a wielder of an instrument to the instrument” (emphasis added). This is clearly the
position of a dualist: instead of conceiving of the body’s actuality (entelecheia) as coming
from a supervening principle (i.e. form), he conceives it as coming from another
substance, as an instrument has actuality when it is being used by its wielder.22 When we
juxtapose this with Avicenna’s remark in §10 regarding the status of the soul after death,
we return to the tension between form and self-subsistent substance. There, Avicenna
calls the soul a form and he curiously brands the body “a receptacle,” a noteworthy
departure from the more traditional and Aristotelian “matter.” This could be interpreted as
22 Although Aquinas, in De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas, sec. 6, is addressing the Averroists, his
explanation of how a body can acquire actuality from something other than form is particularly useful.
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indication of how Avicenna is finally coming to terms with the fact that his theory of the
soul has little resemblance left to hylomorphism; and that, by calling the soul “form” and
the body “matter,” he would just be confusing things further. Alternatively, this
phenomenon might be an indication of the fact that Avicenna, at this point in his career,
had little reason to appear Aristotelian. Whatever the reason, which we will be examining
in the next section, Avicenna qualifies his choice of words as if precisely admitting that
he has little hylomorphism left in his philosophy: he says in §10 that he does not mean
“receptacle” in the sense of it being filled spatially by some occupant, but rather in the
sense of it being filled by something else’s activity. This implies that he uses “form” in
the sense of it being the principle of that activity, which is stricter than the Aristotelian
sense. For Aristotle, form is not only a principle of activity, but it is also primarily a
principle of being to the matter it supervenes; for Avicenna, the only sense of “form” that
was worthy of being imported into his philosophy was Aristotle’s secondary and ancillary
one. That this sense of “form” may be clearer, if we map it on to the analogy of the
instrument and the wielder, the body is the instrument, and the form (the soul) is the
wielder.23 The question this raises is why Avicenna would wish to replace “matter” with
“receptacle” but maintain “form” for “soul.” Although the first would finally suggest a
distancing from hylomorphism, the second seems to imply an attachment to it that he is
still unable to shake off, even in this work, his last one.

23 Avicenna does not address what would be the logical extension of this: that if every principle of activity
is a form, then a horse pulling a wagon is the form of wagon, just as a combustion which started a fire
would be the form of fire, both of which propositions are absurd.

15

André Gregori

The Problem of Hylomorphism and Dualism
in Avicenna: A Guide to Resolving Other Tensions

III. Why include hylomorphism, and why not?
We see in the prologue of the Compendium that Avicenna wrote it as a dedication
to a prince, whom we find in his autobiography to be the Sāmānid sultān Nūḥ ibnMansūr. Avicenna was around sixten years-old at the time of composition (ca. 996); he
was living in Buhārā, the capital of the soon-to-crumble Sāmānid empire. In the
autobiography we are told of how, when Avicenna was eighteen, he, having already
mastered medicine as well as a variety of other disciplines, and, having started to make a
name for himself among physicians because he frequently read and studied with them,
was summoned to help cure ibn-Mansūr, who had to succumbed to a rare
disease.24 Perhaps the fact that he came to the attention of the physicians in the first place
was because he had submitted the Compendium to ibn-Mansūr four years before.
Regardless, this event not only brought Avicenna to the sultān’s attention, but awarded
him the right to study the rare books in the prince’s library, many of which were Greek in
provenance,25 transmitted to the Arab world through the Christian Syriac tradition and the
Arabic translations of ʾIsḥāq ibn-Ḥunayn and al-Kindī’s circle. Since Avicenna only
gained access to the library after he completed the Compendium, the rare books he saw
there did not in fact have an impact on his writing. He had, however, by that point,
already intensively studied “all the parts of philosophy.”26 The Compendium was
precisely a product of such intense study, and is widely considered to be Avicenna’s
maiden work.27

24
25
26
27

The Life of Ibn Sina, 35.
Ibid., 37.
Ibid., 27.
Van Dyck, A Compendium on the Soul, sec. Preface
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We are told in the autobiography that Avicenna was assigned an administrative
post with the sultān just around the time of his father’s death;28 although Avicenna does
not supply the year, the translator, William Gohlman, citing Avicenna’s disciple ibnFunduq,29 believes it was around 1002, some four years after the Compendium was
written; the dating suggests that the work could have assisted in capturing the attention of
the court physicians but also of the Sāmānids themselves. It makes sense that it would,
since this seems to have been Avicenna’s intention in the first place: he had wished to
present ibn-Mansūr with a gift that would be, in his own words, “of all presents, the one
he [would] appreciate most.”30 In a very practical level, therefore, this treatise was the
medium in which Avicenna had chosen to show off his talents to the prince; as such,
Avicenna would, in all probability, want to work in those aspects of his philosophy that
would make him look the most appealing, while also excluding the ones that would raise
any question concerning his intellectual or even religious integrity.
In this light, we can begin to understand why the treatise is the most
accommodating to the tension between the soul’s purported hylomorphism and its selfsubsistent substantiality: Avicenna was trying to keep the polemics to a minimum.
Moreover, we later learn in On the Rational Soul, in which Avicenna makes a brief
mention of the Compendium, that he crafted the treatise as a “research” paper,31 meant to
be reflective of—not in conflict with—what was then the state of philosophy inherited
from the Greeks (falsafa). The Compendium was not, in other words, meant to be
original. In fact, if we compare the Compendium to the much more thorough De anima
28
29
30
31

The Life of Ibn Sina, 41.
Ibid., 124.
A Compendium on the Soul, sec. Prologue.
On the Rational Soul, §11.
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from The Cure, we find that the sections not included in the former were precisely those
that, insofar as they were original, were therefore neither uncontroversial nor reflective of
the current state of falsafa. These missing sections are: the doctrine of the perfected “holy
soul” (which explains prophecy), the argument for the temporal origination of the soul,
the denial of the soul’s ability to transmigrate, and, more importantly, the argument for
the immortality of the soul. When juxtaposed to this list, Avicenna’s decision to include
the argument for the soul’s substantiality in Chapter 9 seems like a serious anomaly; yet
his unwillingness to go much farther, that is, his hesitance to brand the soul, at this point,
as self-subsistent, perhaps indicates that Chapter 9 was included only as a matter of
interpretative clarification. As we have seen in Section II.1, the arguments in Chapter 9
were also not wholly irreconcilable with Aristotle’s position.
In fact, far from an anomaly, the arguments in Chapter 9 of the Compendium
actually foreshadow the overt espousal of dualism that we first see in Chapter III.6 of The
Origin and the Return. In this treatise, Avicenna incorporates most of the elements from
the Compendium into a much wider Neoplatonic emanationist scheme. Aristotle’s active
intellect, for instance, originally just the nous poietikos abiding in each individual person,
is transformed to correspond to the lowest of the Neoplatonists’ celestial intellects.32 The
reason why Avicenna would make these accretions is still the matter under inspection. We
can start to form an answer to this question by considering the very first sentence of The
Origin and the Return:
“In this treatise I wish to show the truth of what one finds among the Peripatetics
and what they arrived at concerning the origin and the return so as to gain favor

32 The Origin and the Return, chap. III.5.
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with the shaykh Abū-Aḥmad ibn-Muḥammad ibn-Ibrāhīm al-Fārisī.” 33
Avicenna admits here that he wrote the treatise for a very practical purpose, which remits
to the Compendium: just as that treatise was written back in 998 to please a sultān, ibnMansūr, so was The Origin and the Return written in around 1012-1014 to please a
shaykh, al-Fārisī. The method employed in each work was also essentially the same: to
show off a talent in exposing and commenting on Peripatetic philosophy. The difference
is that, while the Compendium was intended to be a summary of the Peripatetics’
psychology, Avicenna purported to make The Origin and the Return an exposition of
what he thought was their cosmology. This difference makes it clearer why Avicenna
would have included elements from Neoplatonism to begin with: in so doing, he was
simply reflecting what was then already customary among expositors of falsafa. Such a
pervasive culture of integrating Neoplatonism into Aristotelianism was partially due to
authorship misattributions traceable to the translation processes. Ever since al-Kindī, for
instance, translated and reorganized Plotinus’ Enneads, giving it the new title The
Theology of Aristotle, much of the Arab world bought into the false notion that Aristotle
himself had held Plotinus’ views. Still, although this fact helps us understand why
Avicenna would include Neoplatonism in a work purporting to be an exposition of
“Peripatetic” cosmology, the question remains as to why Avicenna would make original
accretions to an already-established philosophical and interpretative tradition. Previous
synthesizers

like

al-Fārābi

had

successfully

incorporated

Neoplatonism

into

Aristotelianism without having to recur, for instance, to arguments of the soul’s self-

33 Ibid., sec. Prologue.
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subsistent substantiality.34
The history surrounding the composition of The Origin and the Return suggests a
few alternative answers. First, there is the fact that—like the Compendium—this treatise
was a dedication, this time to a shaykh, al-Fārisī. Unlike the sultān ibn-Mansūr, however,
who figures in a variety of historical accounts, we actually know very little about alFārisī.35 All the records we have about the man are the ones that Avicenna’s closest
disciple, Abū-ʿUbayd al-Juzjānī, provides in his biography of Avicenna: first, that alFārisī was an “amateur of [these] philosophical sciences,” i.e. the ones included in The
Origin and the Return; second, that Avicenna was ultimately successful in securing alFārisī’s patronage, since the man gave him a house.36 Our present ignorance concerning
al-Fārisī’s life is admittedly an obstacle to understanding why Avicenna would seek the
favor of that man in particular. We can still, however, extrapolate an answer based on a
few suggestive facts: For one, we are left with the title “shaykh,” which was was used
back then (as it is now) as a form of respect meaning roughly “wise elder.” Avicenna’s
calling al-Fārisī a “shaykh” perhaps hints at the fact that the man had a certain amount of
influence within the local intellectual, if not political, communities. It seems that access
to the latter was specifically what Avicenna sought; after all, he did write the treatise just
after a calamitous period in his life, in which he was expelled from Buhārā and forced to
move from city to city. In fact, Avicenna’s stay in Jurjān, al-Fārisī’s city, was a rare
moment of quietude for him: by 1005, some 7 years before The Origin and the Return
was written, the Qarāhānid Turks had overrun the Sāmānids in Buhārā. With this,

34 See al-Fārābi, L'épître Sur L'intellect (Al-Risāla Fīʾl-ʿAql)
35 The Life of Ibn Sina, 126 n54; Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 98 n1.
36 Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 98
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Avicenna had effectively lost the protection gained during the sultanate of ibn-Mansūr.
Since Avicenna had previously held a high post in the sultān’s administration, he likely
found little or no favor with the occupying Turks. As a matter of fact, we know from the
autobiography that the reason he moved to Jurjān in the first place was to be under the
protection of Amīr Qābūs, then the ruler of the province. Before Avicenna got there,
however, the amīr was seized and thrown in jail. 37 The safety of Jurjān, therefore, was at
best uncertain. In fact, we know that shortly after moving to Jurjān Avicenna relocated to
Dihistān, where he stayed for an equally short period, possibly because he was taken
seriously ill; from there he moved back to Jurjān, where, if al-Fārisī’s patronage meant
anything, Avicenna was probably more well-connected. It does not seem unreasonable,
then, that The Origin and the Return should have been written to attract the attention of
potential intellectual sponsors and political protectors. Shaykh al-Fārisī might have been
the gateway to these men, or he might have been one himself (he did, after all, give
Avicenna a place to live). We also know that by the time Avicenna had met his disciple
al-Juzjānī (ca. 1012), he was employed by Sultān Ziyārid Qābūs of Jurjān, implying he
did eventually capture the attention of the local political elite, either through the
intermediation of al-Fārisī or through some other means.38 Either way, this would suggest
that Avicenna’s purpose in The Origin and the Return, which was a dedicatory work like
the Compendium, was to please; and that, just as Avicenna was wary of new and
potentially polemical ideas in the earlier Compendium, so would he want to be cautious
in this later treatise.
This was not, however, what Avicenna did. Rather, he starkly departed in The
37 The Life of Ibn Sina, 43
38 The Cure, al-Juzjānī's Introduction §2; Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 60 n3

21

André Gregori

The Problem of Hylomorphism and Dualism
in Avicenna: A Guide to Resolving Other Tensions

Origin and the Return from the careful “research” method employed in the Compendium.
In fact, whereas in the latter Avicenna avoided polemics, in the former he included many
of the polemical parts that we later see in The Cure39—among which we class Avicenna’s
overt espousal of dualism. This is admittedly surprising; our surprise is only tempered by
the fact that he was not all reckless: in The Origin and the Return, as afterwards in The
Cure, Avicenna diligently refuted objections in an attempt to show how his conclusions
were both sounder and had more explanatory power than those of his objectors. 40 This
new method is perhaps a sign that Avicenna, by this point thirty-two years old, was
growing more intellectually mature and secure. At a point in his life in which there was
so much to threaten his well-being, it would seem logical that he would want to find
physical security by employing the talent about which he felt most secure. It would
therefore seem unreasonable that he would go out on a limb making potentially
dangerous novel claims—unless he were confident that these innovations were buttressed
by a strong foundation.
A hypothesis as to the purpose such innovations served is that they would set
Avicenna apart from other potential competitors, and, if persuasive, would do much to
enrich the learning of such an “amateur of [the philosophical] sciences” as al-Fārisī.
Furthermore, Avicenna’s sense of intellectual security must not have developed in a
vacuum. In fact, we know that by this point Avicenna had already garnered a certain
reputation for being a great intellectual; so much is implied by the verses that al-Juzjānī
recited to him on the occasion of his return to Jurjān:

39 Listed at the top of page 18.
40 An example of which we analyzed in section II.2.

22

André Gregori

The Problem of Hylomorphism and Dualism
in Avicenna: A Guide to Resolving Other Tensions

“When I became great, no country could hold me;
When my price went up, I lacked a buyer” (emphasis added). 41

Avicenna therefore had a name to live up to; merely regurgitating Neoplatonic cosmology
and Aristotelian psychology would not suffice to put him on a plain any higher than that
of the many other expositors of his time, which is why he included the original
accretions. We have direct evidence, in fact, that Avicenna included these novel claims
into his work precisely to distinguish it from that of competing expositors. One such
piece of evidence is a letter that Avicenna wrote to a disciple, a certain Kiyā. In the letter
Avicenna makes particular mention of a group of intellectual rivals based in Baġdād,42
whom he accuses of “disagreement, obtuseness, and wavering […] on the subject of the
soul and the intellects,” branding them “simple-minded.”43 His particular point of
contention with them is that they lacked an understanding of the fundamental principles
underlying Aristotle’s psychology. These principles, we are told, are to be inferred from
the Physics; importantly, however, they are not manifest in themselves. Rather, Aristotle
supposedly “concealed” them; Avicenna’s principal problem with the Baġdādīs is
precisely that they had thus far been unable to reveal these hidden principles. The effect
of this is that they “approached the house from the rear instead of the [front] door,” that
is, they built their entire interpretation of Aristotle on a stack of cards, on flimsy
41 The Life of Ibn Sina, 43.
42 Although the letter was written in 1036, one year before Avicenna’s death (that is, many years after the
writing of The Origin and the Return in around 1012), it alludes to a group of Baġdādī expositors who,
according to Gutas, were Nestorian Christians, and among whom was a certain famous writer Abū-lFarraj Ibn-at-Tayyib. We learn from Richard Walzer that this man was a disciple of the Arabic translator
and expositor Al-Ḥasan ibn-Suwār (fl. 942-after 1017). The Baġdād Nestorians were therefore active
during the entirety of Avicenna’s lifetime.
See particularly Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 60 n1; Walzer, “New Light on the
Arabic Translations of Aristotle,” 102
43 Avicenna, “Letter to Kiyā,” quoted in Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 60
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superficialities rather than deep first principles.44 Elucidating these hidden first principles
is just the task that Avicenna sets for himself in The Origin and the Return, and it is
precisely through this that he would seek to distinguish himself. The last paragraph of the
treatise’s preface seems to suggest as much:
“In these [three] parts I intend to clarify what [the Peripatetics] have left obscure,
to reveal what they have hidden and concealed, to gather what they have
dispersed, to unfold what they have summarized into few words, to the best of the
limited capacity of a person beset by many difficulties: the age of scholarship is
becoming extinct, concern with the objects of philosophy is diminishing and
turned towards other pursuits, and hatred is turned against those who labor for
unveiling a part of Truth. Moreover, eagerness and energy are exhausted from the
minds of those who have suffered and been the subjects of so many trials of this
age as I have been. But God is our recourse, for with Him are power and might!”
(emphasis added).45
That the self-subsistent substantiality of the soul is one of these things that the
Peripatetics “have left obscure” is once again evinced by the letter to Kiyā. One of
Avicenna’s qualms with the Baġdādīs is that they left out a fundamental principle from
their exposition of Aristotle’s De anima, namely, that “the thing in which the universal
intelligibles are conceived is indivisible.”46 This is essentially that same argument we saw
in Chapter 9 of the Compendium; it is from this argument that Avicenna, back then,
already deduced the soul’s substantiality. But in the letter to Kiyā he makes it clear that
his interpretation did not stop there. Rather, he derives from the argument of indivisibility
what he could not make explicit in the Compendium: that the soul is per se subsistens.
Ultimately, then, this is a conclusion that Avicenna infers from “what they [the
Peripatetics] have hidden and concealed.” That Avicenna, therefore, should have included

44 Ibid.
45 The Origin and the Return, sec. Preface.
46 Avicenna, “Letter to Kiyā,” quoted in Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 61
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this novel claim in a work as early in his career as the The Origin and the Return, would
set him leagues apart from the Baġdādī expositors, and thereby might have given him an
aura of a singular and unmatched understanding of Aristotle that would merit him the
much needed patronage of any true “amateur of the philosophical sciences.” It would not
be surprising, therefore, that it was only a little after The Origin and the Return was
finished and copies were made that Avicenna started garnering sufficient attention from
intellectuals from lands near and far as to award him the companionship of a cohort of
promising disciples, the most notorious of which was Abū-ʿUbayd al-Juzjānī.
It was supposedly for these disciples that Avicenna wrote his philosophical
magnum opus, The Cure. His motivation to do so was apparently their frequent entreaties
to collect his works into a single treatise. Al-Juzjānī composed an introduction to The
Cure in which he details this fact: apparently he and other disciples47 were gathered with
Avicenna in Jurjān and were lamenting the fact that their master had scarcely kept copies
of his past work for them to consult, upon which pretext they requested that he would
write them a new, comprehensive work including all areas of his philosophy.48 Avicenna
was at first hesitant but agreed upon the condition that they would not demand from him
that he should stick to the ipsissima verba of the texts of falsafa.49 This was an important
precondition, as Avicenna’s brief period of quietude in Jurjān soon came to an end with
even more political turmoil, precluding access to the Aristotelian corpus. Some of the
events that followed are very colorful, and it is all the more impressive that Avicenna
should have continued writing such a massive and encyclopedic work as The Cure

47 Ibid., 41 n8
48 The Cure, sec. al-Juzjānī's Introduction §3
49 Ibid.; Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 41 n9
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throughout all these events. For a while Avicenna had relative security to do this, since he
even took up another administrative post (besides the one he had with Sultān Ziyārid
Qābūs) with the sultān of nearby Rayy, Majd ad-Dawla.50 This proved, however, a bad
mistake, as this new sultān was soon toppled by the invading forces of Amīr Šams-adDawla, forcing Avicenna to move again.51 It is from this period onwards that he had
infrequent access to primary sources. By this point he had been able to start work on the
physical and logical parts of The Cure with access to Aristotle,52 but as we will see below
this soon came to an end.
Since Avicenna was forced to move, he went this time to Hamadān, the capital of
the invading kingdom. What is quite impressive is how, by this point, Avicenna had
become very good in capturing the attention of potential patrons. Even in a completely
new environment, not to say a heretofore hostile country, Avicenna also managed to
quickly climb the ranks, working his way into this amir’s administration, and up higher
than he had ever done before.53 This came at a cost to his writing, however, as his new
“occupation was distressful” and “a waste of our [Avicenna’s and al-Juzjānī’s] time.” 54
This new occupation was the vizierate, which he was awarded after he treated the amīr of
a colic, but which was “distressful” because it nearly cost him his life: Avicenna was not
much of a military commander, though he was obliged to be one in his new capacity,
which resulted in his troops mutinying against him, demanding his execution.55 Though
50
51
52
53

The Life of Ibn Sina, 49
Ibid., 51.
The Cure: De anima, sec. al-Juzjānī's Introduction §2.
Apparently Avicenna was aided by a certain benefactress named Kadabānūyah, but what principally
catapulted him to preeminence was the very practical utility that he offered the amīr: experienced as he
was in medicine, he treated the sovereign of a deadly disease, much like he had done in the episode of
ibn-Mansūr. See The Life of Ibn Sina, 53
54 The Cure: De anima, sec. al-Juzjānī's Introduction §3
55 The Life of Ibn Sina, 53.
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the amīr refused, Avicenna was sent to jail, but eventually called back as the king
relapsed again into disease. Treating the amīr a second time awarded Avicenna not only
his freedom but the vizierate again.56 During this period he went back to work on The
Cure, composing the mathematical parts and writing more of the physics, still with access
to Aristotle (he had not yet begun, however, the psychological parts).57 During this
interval of relative security was also when he finished the first book of The Canon of
Medicine; yet, as was the pattern with Avicenna’s life, this period too soon came to an
end as the amīr died of the colic while on campaign. This time, however, Avicenna’s
security was not immediately threatened, since the amīr’s successor and the courts
wanted him to stay on as vizier. Avicenna’s plans, though, were elsewhere: he decided to
go into voluntary exile, partially because he wanted to support another, contending king,
and partially because he wanted to rid himself of his “distressful” bureaucratic duties.58 It
was in this period that he finished the Physics of The Cure, writing particularly the
psychological parts; he also quite prolifically composed the entire metaphysical part. AlJuzjānī recounts he did this in less than twenty days, but, more importantly, without
access to any sources.59
If al-Juzjānī’s account is true, it means that Avicenna wrote the entire De anima of
The Cure based only on his own original ideas and on what he had committed to memory
from Aristotle and the commentary traditions. This has the momentous implication that
Avicenna’s purpose by this point, at least in the De anima and in the Metaphysics of The
Cure, was not simply to expose Aristotle, nor to extract the “concealed” fundamental
56
57
58
59

Ibid.
The Cure, sec. Prologue §5
Avicenna, The Life of Ibn Sina, 57
The Cure, sec. al-Juzjānī's Introduction §4
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principles from Aristotle’s terse and often cryptic accounts of corollary principles, but
rather to describe the fundamental principles in themselves, regardless of all the
hermeneutical and historical baggage. This helps explain why the psychological parts of
The Cure are such a drastic departure from hylomorphism, much less accommodating
than the Compendium and The Origin and the Return: Avicenna’s project, here, was not
to be an Aristotelian fundamentalist but a fundamentals fundamentalist. Thus the first
sentence from the prologue to the entire The Cure:
“Our purpose in this book, which we hope that time will allow us to complete, and
that success granted by God will attend us in its composition, is to set down in it
the gist of the Fundamental Principles which we have Ascertained—both the
Fundamental Principles contained in the philosophical sciences attributed to the
ancients and based on methodical and Verified theoretical analysis, and the
Fundamental Principles Discovered by [a series of] insights cooperatively
attaining the truth which was diligently pursued for a long time—until it finally
results in a straightforward compendium upon which most opinions will agree and
which will help remove the veils of fanciful notions” (emphasis added). 60
Notice that Avicenna describes here two methods of attaining the fundamental principles:
the first, through explication of what the ancients wrote; the second, through a separate
process, which entails “discovery” by “insights.” Since Avicenna did not have Aristotle
in front of him when writing The Cure’s De anima, the method employed therein must
have been the second. Curiously, however, even if Avicenna was not using Aristotle, he
still retained the latter’s vocabulary (though not his semantics). We can only speculate as
to why he would do so, but it seems logical that he would want to keep a language
understood by his audience, who were in this case his disciples, and who were used to the
very peculiar jargon of falsafa. Moreover, even if The Cure’s De anima was written
without an explication of Aristotle’s texts, there were sections in The Cure, particularly
60 Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 50.
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the Logic and sthe earlier parts of the Physics, that still closely reflected the commentary
traditions. As such, Avicenna would need a common language for all The Cure, which is
why terms like “form,” “matter,” “substance,” and “perfection” are to be found
throughout all the multiple parts of this truly encyclopedic work. At the same time,
keeping a single common language for the whole of The Cure would have required a deal
semantic gymnastics, especially when Avicenna’s independently discovered fundamental
principles conflicted with those already established in the commentary tradition. It is of
no wonder, therefore, that by the time Avicenna got around to writing the De anima, that
is, the sixth and last book of The Cure’s Physics, his usage of “form” and “substance”
only fit Aristotle’s language materially, but in fact had substantially departed from it in
meaning. This should help explain his analogical use of the words that we described in
Section II.3 above.
Avicenna in his last treatise On the Rational Soul had none of the aforementioned
reasons for keeping a strict adherence to Aristotle’s language: unlike The Cure, this was a
short and cursory summary of his psychology, and psychology alone; it was not explicitly
written for his disciples; nor was it a dedicatory piece like the Compendium or The
Origin and the Return. In fact, we have nothing that directly points to why he wrote it.
The treatise’s last paragraph, however, provides a few telling clues:
“This then is what we wished to mention on this occasion in explanation of this
divine word [i.e. the rational soul]. As for the demonstrative proof establishing
that the rational soul is a substance, subsists by itself, is free of any corporeality, is
not imprinted on any corporeal entity, survives after the death of the human body,
and whether its condition after death is one of blessing or punishment, it involves
a long and elaborate investigation and can be brought to light only after numerous
premisses have been mentioned. As a matter of fact, I happened to write at the
beginning of my career forty years ago a summary treatise setting forth the
knowledge about the soul and related matters by following the method of those
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who engage in philosophy through research; whoever wishes to find out about the
soul should study this treatise because it is appropriate for students who do
research. But God Almighty, ‘guides whomsoever He will’ to the way of those
who engage in philosophy through direct experience—may He put us and you in
the latter group!” (emphasis added).61
Avicenna is saying here that On the Rational Soul is not a collection of proofs; in fact, he
points to the Compendium those students who might like to read such proofs. These are
the students “who do research,” i.e. those who read other people’s proofs or expositions
of the truth. It is the last sentence, however, that suggests to whom Avicenna really was
writing, and the concluding prayer is a clear indication of how he was biased towards this
group; yet who were they? He tells us they are students “who engage in philosophy
through direct experience.” Now, since he pits these people against the ones who do
research, we know it excludes those students who attain philosophical truths through
proofs. Does that mean, then, that the students in question are the ones who work things
out for themselves? Or does the meaning of the phrase hinge on the word “experience,”
implying some sort of mysticism? Scholars like Seyyed Nasr have defended the last
position.62 We will contend in the next section that, though there are elements in
Avicenna’s philosophy that might seem mystical, the explanation for them is in fact more
mundane. Meanwhile, we are left with the task of explaining why Avicenna was less
accommodating to hylomorphism in On the Rational Soul than in any of the other works
we have considered herein. In a very specific sense, the reason we propose remits to the
one we suggested in our discussion of The Cure: Avicenna here seems to want to
maintain a position of “fundamentals fundamentalism;” in other words, he here seems

61 Avicenna, On the Rational Soul, §11
62 Nasr, An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines.
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more concerned with expounding fundamental principals than with strictly adhering to
the constrictive language of the Aristotelian commentary tradition. The difference is that
the hurdles that kept him attached to a superficially hylomorphic language in The Cure’s
De anima were no longer present for him when he was writing On the Rational Soul—
which would explain why he stopped calling the body “matter” and instead settled on the
much less hylomorphic “receptacle.” Since the treatise intentionally reads much more
like a dogmatic list of facts than a presentation of proofs, Avicenna was under no
obligation to try to work in, or even address, conflicting positions. Indeed, it would seem
odd in the context of this treatise—which is so short and cursory—if he did.

IV. Avicenna’s independence of thought
To this point, we have argued for four key claims relating to the tension between
Avicenna’s apparently hylomorphic definition of the soul on the one hand, and his
dualistic conception of it on the other: (i) that although the inspected psychological works
differ in terms of language and terminology, in terms of the material they expose they
only differ with regard to quantity, not substance; (ii) that Avicenna was not able, in any
of the treatises we have inspected, to satisfactorily reconcile his dualistic view of the soul
with the traditional hylomorphic one, nor vindicate this latter one over the former; (iii)
that this tension grew progressively more severe over time, Avicenna coming to embrace
dualism more overtly; (iv) that the presence of hylomorphism in each of the inspected
works, as well as the degree of such presence, can be strongly explained in each case by
circumstantial, non-philosophical, historical reasons. The question now turns to
Avicenna’s independence as a thinker, which we framed by two possible extremes in our
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Introduction: the first, that Avicenna was merely an iteration in a long chain, an
intellectual heir to a variety of preceding philosophical traditions, the doctrines of which
formed the substance of his incidentally original philosophy; the second, that he was an
independent thinker in his own right, discovering the principles of his philosophy mostly
by himself, which principles he would then dress in the language of preceding traditions
for reasons external to the system. Here, we will contend that the truth, though not
negating the first extreme, approaches more the second one. We infer this claim from the
conclusions we have enumerated above and from additional primary material: our
conclusions all point towards the second extreme, which tendency we will try to support
and confirm by Avicenna’s own account of his role and method as a philosopher.
Our conclusions complement one another; if we take them together, we can infer a
further set of conclusions. First, if Avicenna was truly unsuccessful in incorporating
hylomorphism into his psychology (ii), and if his psychological works really only differ
with regard to the quantity, not substance, of their arguments (i), then it should follow
either that Avicenna was a poor philosopher from the start, never really understanding the
strain in his philosophy with regard to hylomorphism; or, that he never really espoused
the doctrine to begin with. We have found reasons that strongly justify the second,
reasons not particularly philosophical, but instead, practical (iv). These circumstantial
reasons also explain why Avicenna grew progressively less accommodating to dualism
over time (iii). In fact, if Avicenna never really did uphold hylomorphism, but included it
in his philosophy for reasons external to it, then the most faithful reflection of his views
are to be found precisely in the works that are less accommodating to hylomorphic
terminology. Among the works we have inspected, we can single out both the De anima
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from The Cure and On the Rational Soul, since in the first Avicenna only used Aristotle’s
words but not their meanings (cf. page 29), and in the second, he even dropped the words
altogether (cf. page 31). Since these are also his most original works, containing
arguments that, to this point in the commentary traditions, were never previously upheld
(such as the argument for the prophetic “holy soul”); and since, as we have argued,
Avicenna’s position on these matters never really alters substantially, but is only more
manifested in these later works; then it follows that Avicenna was an original thinker
from the start, which means he arrived at many of his most groundbreaking conclusions
independently from the commentary traditions. This does not mean, however, that
Avicenna was wholly unaffected by the commentary traditions, as the second extreme
would hold. Rather, we here contend—and primary source materials seem to point this
way as well, as we will discuss below—that as regards the first principles of his
philosophy (such as the self-subsistent substantiality of the soul), Avicenna established
them on his own. He was, however, admittedly guided by the commentary traditions, and
he did, in fact, incorporate on top of these first principles a series of corollary claims
(such as Aristotle’s divisions of the soul), which he patently inherited from his
predecessors.
Avicenna’s discussion of his philosophical method reinforces the conclusions of
the previous paragraph. In the prologue to The Cure, he observes that there are certain
“fundamental principles” which can be ascertained either by a “methodical and verified
theoretical analysis” of what the ancients wrote, or by “insights cooperatively attaining
the truth.”63 We saw a reflection of this later in On the Rational Soul when Avicenna
63 The Cure, sec. Prologue §1
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distinguished between students who attain the truth by reading truths and those who
attain it by discovering things through their own genius.64 As we saw in that same
passage, Avicenna aspired to be in the latter group; it was his goal, therefore, to be an
independent thinker. Avicenna himself admits he did attain this independence of thought;
in The Cure, for instance, he says: “I added some of the things which I perceived through
my own reflection and whose validity I determined through my own theoretical analysis,
especially in Physics and Metaphysics—and even in Logic.”65 In a letter to an unnamed
disciple, Avicenna adds: “[God] has granted me an incessant certainty about fundamental
principles which the seeker of salvation must without fail know, and a wide-ranging
competence in subsequent areas.”66
This last statement in particular would seem to warrant Seyyed Nasr’s claim that
Avicenna was not just a philosopher but a mystic. The fact, however, is that Avicenna had
a complete theory—an elaborate explanatory framework, in fact—for the process by
which philosophers attain the truth, which theory might be branded “mystical” because it
does have in it an element of the supramundane, but which, insofar as it is an explanatory
framework, is far from being mystical in the sense of “cryptic” or “occult.” Avicenna
develops this framework most fully in the De anima from The Cure and later in The
Salvation. In a nutshell, he argues that knowledge is acquired analogously to the way in
which conclusions are inferred from premises in Syllogistic Logic: just as a conclusion
can only be inferred in a syllogism if there is a common middle term to the premises, so
does knowledge proceed from the apprehended essence of things by means of such a
64 On the Rational Soul, §11
65 The Cure, sec. Prologue §2.
66 Avicenna, “Letter to an Anonymous Disciple,” quoted in Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian
Tradition, 60
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“middle term.” Avicenna argues, however, that the acquisition of this “middle term”
depends upon a certain perfected ability that the human intellect by itself does not
naturally possess. As such, he posits a connection between our limited intellect and a
supernal or celestial intellect, the Active Intellect, which, because of its closer place to
God in the emanationist scheme, does somehow have the ability. This connection is
“intuition” (hads). Avicenna, however, concludes that there are varying degrees of it,
some people (prophets) perceiving truth much like a person senses color; others having
more difficulty, requiring a bit of research (philosophers); while others still have almost
no ability at all, needing to be taught everything.67 In this light, we can start to understand
Avicenna’s distinction in On the Rational Soul between people who attain the truths of
philosophy “through research” and those who attain them “through direct experience:”68
ultimately, the more intuition one has, the more directly one would experience truth.
We have seen how Avicenna in On the Rational Soul aspires to be among those
who have intuition. In that treatise, however, he does not specify the desired degree; nor
does it suggest anything about his place on the scheme of intuition. We encounter a much
more telling account, however, in Avicenna’s introduction to The Easterners:
“As for ourselves, getting to understand what they [the Peripatetics] said has been
easy for us from the very moment when we first occupied ourselves with it since
it is not unlikely that Philosophical Sciences may have come to us from a
direction other than that of the Greeks. We were occupied with it in the prime of
our youth, and were granted such success by God that we were able thereby to
come to comprehend in a short time what they bequeathed” (emphasis added).69
By claiming that philosophy came to him through an avenue other than the Greeks, and
67 The Salvation, chap. VI
68 On the Rational Soul, §11
69 The Easterners, §2
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by attributing to God such success, Avicenna here seems to be placing himself among the
philosophers who have some intuition but who, unlike the prophets, still require some
research (in this case, into the doctrines of the Peripatetics) to attain certain knowledge.
The excerpted passage above seems to be parallel to one from the autobiography, in
which Avicenna describes how, in his youth, he used to go to the mosque to pray that the
“middle terms” be revealed to him:
“Because of those problems that used to baffle me, not being able to solve the
middle term of the syllogism, I used to visit the mosque frequently and worship,
praying humbly to the All-Creating until He opened the mystery of it to me and
made the difficult seem easy.” (emphasis added). 70
The implication of both these passages is that Avicenna was, admittedly, not supremely
gifted like a prophet, that is, to the extent that he would be able to perceive truth simply
as we perceive colors; yet he admits having been given some intuition to understand
reality without having to spend much time doing very deep research. On the other hand,
in the letter to an unnamed disciple, Avicenna admits that he came “to know things which
[he had] verified and [could] not be improved,” though he only did this through “great
effort,” and the results were “few.”71
The image we are left of Avicenna, therefore, is of a man eminently conscious of
his place in the intellectual spectrum: he knew he was intelligent, yes; that he had an
intuitive perception of reality; and that, only because of this, he was able to ascertain the
hidden truths of the Peripatetics. At the same time, however, he knew that he was not a
prophet; he admitted that he still had to work hard to attain those truths he ascertained;
70 The Life of Ibn Sina, 29
71 Avicenna, “Letter to an Anonymous Disciple,” quoted in Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian
Tradition, 59
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and that, as such, he was indeed indebted to his predecessors. This does not mean,
however, that he saw see himself merely as an iteration in a long chain. Rather, he quite
clearly states in The Easterners that his position among the Peripatetics was more a
matter of convenience than philosophical alignment:
“Now, since those who are occupied with Philosophy are forcefully asserting their
descent from the Peripatetics among the Greeks, we were loath to create schisms
and disagree with the majority of the people. We thus joined their ranks and
adhered in a partisan spirit to the Peripatetics, since they were the sect among
them most worthy of such an adherence. We perfected what they meant to say but
fell short of doing, never reaching their aim in it; and we pretended not to see
what they were mistaken about, devising reasons for it and pretexts, while we
were conscious of its real nature and aware of its defect. If ever we spoke out
openly our disagreement with them, then it concerned matters which it was
impossible to tolerate. The greater part [of these matters], however, we concealed
with the veils of feigned neglect.”72
As we have seen throughout this paper, the issue of hylomorphism in psychology was
probably one of these areas of disagreement. The fact that he attempted to accommodate
it into his dualistic account of the soul in the beginning of his career perhaps
distinguishes it from those areas of disagreement about which he “feigned neglect;” that
he was ultimately unsuccessful, however, and that he eventually dropped it altogether,
means that, notwithstanding his attempts to “devis[e] reasons for it and pretexts,”
ultimately his allegiance was to what he perceived as truth, not partisanship.

72 Avicenna, The Easterners, §3

37

André Gregori

The Problem of Hylomorphism and Dualism
in Avicenna: A Guide to Resolving Other Tensions
Bibliography

al-Fārābi. L'épître Sur L'intellect (Al-Risāla Fīʾl-ʿAql). Translated by Dyala Hamzah.
Collection "Traduire la philosophie";. Paris, France: Harmattan, 2001.
Aquinas, St. Thomas. De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas. Edited by L. W. Keeler.
Textum Taurini., 1954. http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/can2.html.
---. Sententia libri De anima. Textum Taurini., 1959.
http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/can2.html.
Aristotle. Metaphysics. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Translated by W.D. Ross. The
Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation 71:2. Princeton,
N.J: Princeton University Press, 1984.
---. On the Soul. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Translated by J.A. Smith. The Complete
Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation 71:2. Princeton, N.J:
Princeton University Press, 1984.
Avicenna. A Compendium on the Soul. Verona, Italy: Stamperia di Nicola Paderno, 1906.
---. A Origem e o Retorno. Livraria Martins Fontes Editora Ltda., 2005.
---. Avicenna Latinus: Liber de Anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus. Edited by Simone van
Riet. Translated by Avendauth. Vol. 1. Leuven, Belgium: Éditions Peeters, 1972.
---. Avicenna's Psychology: An English Translation of the Kitāb al-Najāt, Book II,
Chapter VI, with Historico-Philosophical Notes and Textual Improvements on the
Cairo Edition. London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1952.
---. On the Rational Soul. Translated by Dimitri Gutas. Avicenna and the Aristotelian
Tradition v. 4. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988.
---. The Easterners. Translated by Dimitri Gutas. Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition.
Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988.
---. The Life of Ibn Sina. Translated by Gholman William. Albany, NY: State University
of New York Press, 1974.
Cornford, Francis Macdonald, and Plato. Plato's Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato
translated with a running commentary. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd.,
1966.
Gutas, Dimitri. Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading
Avicenna's Philosophical Works. Islamic philosophy and theology. Leiden: E.J.
Brill, 1988.
Hall, Robert E. “Intellect, soul and body in Ibn Sīnā: systematic synthesis and
development of the Aristotelian, Neoplatonic and Galenic theories.” In
Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam: Proceedings of
the Second Conference of the Avicenna Study Group, 62-86. Islamic philosophy,
theology, and science v. 56. Leiden: Brill, 2004.

38

André Gregori

The Problem of Hylomorphism and Dualism
in Avicenna: A Guide to Resolving Other Tensions

McGinnis, Jon. “Introduction.” In Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in
Medieval Islam: Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Avicenna Study
Group, ix-xviii. Islamic philosophy, theology, and science v. 56. Leiden: Brill,
2004.
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines: Conceptions
of Nature and Methods Used for Its Study by the Ikhwān al-Safā’, al-Bīrūnī, and
Ibn Sīnā. Rev. ed.: State University of New York.
Plato. Phaedo. Translated by G. M. A. Grube. Indianapolis, Ind: Hackett Pub, 1997.
Reisman, David C. “The Pseudo-Avicennan Corpus, I: Methodological Considerations.”
In Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam:
Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Avicenna Study Group, 1-21. Islamic
philosophy, theology, and science v. 56. Leiden: Brill, 2004.
Walzer, Richard. “New Light on the Arabic Translations of Aristotle.” Oriens 6, no. 1
(June 30, 1953): 91-142. doi:10.2307/1579236.
Wisnovsky, Robert. “Avicenna and the Avicennan Tradition.” In The Cambridge
Companion to Arabic Philosophy, edited by Peter Adamson and Richard C.
Taylor. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

39

